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I come from Malta: Malta is known to many as a
sun-drenched island in the Mediterranean and a
popular tourist destination, a centre for financial
services within the European Union, as is Dublin
and Luxemburg. The State is also particular in so
far as it has a mixed legal tradition – it is
traditionally a civil law country; however the
common law and sources of English law have
become absorbed by the system and form part of
the sources, owing to the British experience of
Malta. 
In this sense, Malta is among the group of nations that
have a mixed legal tradition, which include Scotland,
Quebec, Louisiana and South Africa. The obvious
reasons for this are historical. Malta has a Roman Law
tradition dating from the Punic Wars, however the main
imprints were the period of rule of the Order of St John
of Jerusalem, Rhodes and Malta – the Knights of St
John, and of the two hundred and fifty odd years of
British experience, with fundamental links that remain
undimmed to date.
In a context that is otherwise within the continental
civil law tradition, the sources of evidence embody the
common law rules of evidence. The rules on best
evidence and relevance, against hearsay, leading, direct
and suggestive questions during examination in chief,
(but allowed in cross examination) are part of the
system. Likewise with the rules by which a witness
cannot be compelled to incriminate him or herself, and
the courts are vested with the discretion to prevent a
witness from answering questions which tend to expose
them to ridicule or degradation. The system has
retained the characteristically common law position of
oral personal testimony, with the demeanor and
behaviour of a witness in the stand acting as
determining factors in credibility and consistency.
These rules have operated alongside and been
integrated with the continental civil law rules of
property and ownership, possession, heirs and
legatees, contract, damages, obligation and guarantees.
Another illustration of the mixed character of the
Maltese system is that the basic private international
law rules follow the British rules, with, for example,
domicile being the connecting factor in many rules of
conflict, saving the recent EU Directives and Regulations
on the matter.1
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1 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters, Official Journal L 012,
16/01/2001 P. 0001 - 0023; Council Regulation (EC)
No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in matrimonial matters and the
matters of parental responsibility, repealing
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, Official Journal L
338, 23/12/2003 P. 0001 - 0029, bis; 1980 Rome
Convention on the law applicable to contractual
obligations (consolidated version), Official Journal
C 027, 26/01/1998 P. 0034 - 0046 and to the First
and Second Protocols, adopted by Chapter 482 of
the Laws of  Malta, http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/
Legislation/English/Leg/VOL_15/Chapt482.pdf; a
proposed EU Regulation Directive, Rome I, is under
discussion to embody the provisions of  the Rome
Convention referred to Regulation (EC) No
864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to
non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199,
31.7.2007, p. 40–49.
The status of digital evidence in civil
proceedings
As a court pleader and litigator from a mixed system,
the concern and point of this paper is to attempt to
assess first, whether digital evidence can qualify as
evidence in civil proceedings, and second, to assess
how far digital evidence in civil proceedings can be
considered to be a reliable and trustworthy source of
evidence.
Evidence comprises those facts as established that
tend to advance the case and position of a party’s case.
All legal systems typically possess rules that receive
and validate as evidence facts, including rules of
exclusion. Although it is acknowledged that it may often
be a fine line of distinction between fact, perception of
facts and opinions or assessments of facts, since these
tend to overlap and blur what appear to be clear
differences, evidence is focused on establishing facts.
The usual rule is he who alleges is to prove: methods of
evidence were traditionally personal testimony by
parties, and the exhibition of formal documents,
principally paper documents or paper based. By
electronic evidence, the specific reference is to that
evidence which requires a computer to be demonstrated
and therefore to be referred to in pleadings.
More specifically, is whether digital evidence is
evidence at all. Evidence includes facts: however, it
includes all those direct impressions and conclusions
that are useful for the judicial process for forming and
establishing conclusions. Evidence establishes the link
between what is claimed or defended and the legal and
moral justification of the claim. This is naturally linked
to what judges and practitioners are well aware of, and
often perceived as being the burden of proof. Examples
of digital evidence include electronic records as part of
invoices to support a charge or a claim for payment,
electronic banking transactions in the form of Swift
funds across jurisdictions, records of electronic and
later inputs for payments, electronic consents and
signatures, electronic pirating of websites or of
intellectual creations such as designs or logos which are
transmitted on-line. Computer content, particularly in
civil proceedings, intellectual property piracy for
example, remains a core aspect of digital evidence. It is
invariably necessary for a person to interpret and
evaluate such evidence, and this inevitably remains at
the core of the exercise.
Classification of digital evidence 
Digital evidence has an intangible quality, although it
can reflect or may reflect or refer to tangible material
objects. It may, however, be recorded in a permanent
form, which may be available at any time. Human
speech and human demeanor in a witness are
intangible attributes, yet transcripts of the evidence of a
witness may be recorded in a permanent (analogue or
digital) form. A finer point is that the recording can be
made with the use of a tape recorder (analogue) or a
computer (digital). The same analysis can arguably be
attributed to digital evidence – it possess an ethereal
and an intangible quality, yet at the same time it is
capable of recording situations which are pertinent to
the facts at issue. All this indicates that for its
apparently ephemeral nature, digital evidence can
indeed capture and permanently store facts tending to
establish or disprove an allegation.
It is suggested that digital evidence in the context of
civil proceedings does indeed qualify as civil evidence,
albeit of a particular more recent and novel type, but
evidence, full and proper evidence, admissible
nonetheless. All the criteria of evidence are satisfied:
capable of transmission and perception, of being
recorded and reduced to permanent form, of challenge,
discredit and of independent testing. Digital evidence
may bear some resemblance to technical findings since
the perception and understanding of the evidence may
require specialized knowledge, including in relation to
the medium, to enable conclusions to be arrived at.
Adaptation of traditional rules of evidence
to digital evidence
The next question assesses the extent of the
assimilation of traditional rules to the new realities of
evidence. Here, the Maltese and international
experience tends generally to suggest that legal rules of
evidence are being adapted to absorb, adapt and
include digital evidence among the rules of evidence.
Malta has some rules, but not a comprehensive
framework on civil digital evidence. The law on
electronic signatures essentially reproduces the EU
Directive.2 There are two significant problems in Malta,
the lack of a clear legislative framework to take in or
relate to such rules, and possibly a cultural reluctance
to implement changes to receive digital evidence as
evidence. This means that there has been some
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2 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a
Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ
L 13, 19.01.2000, p.12; Electronic Commerce Act
2002.
difficulty and some resistance to overcome before
effecting the transition from the traditional rules in their
familiar context to their application to digital evidence.
Following this initial process, however, the conclusion
emerges loud and clear, and is resoundingly that digital
evidence is part of the rules, inclusionary and
exclusionary, of civil evidence.
The next issue is more complex: the extent that digital
evidence is a trustworthy source of evidence.3 This is
linked to its probative value and the extent to which that
evidence and its face value are proof of their contents.
In the same way as the question may arise whether a
paper document is forged, it is possible for the concern
to be voiced as to any corruption and tampering of
evidence and the safeguards against fraud, either by a
party or indeed by the court of its own motion. Once
digital or analogue evidence is attributed probatory
value, then it will be among the factors assessed by a
court in arriving at a decision. Clearly, the general rules
that evidence, including digital evidence, is open to
challenge, has to apply. However, there lurks a general
feeling, almost a suspicion, in the mind of many
litigators about the relative ease by which digital
evidence can be manipulated, precisely because it
exists as an electronic intangible creation. This is not to
say that litigators are generally averse or resistant to
this form of evidence: the sentiment is or tends to be
that it is easier to tamper with digital evidence,
precisely because of its essential ethereal and fleeting
nature, than it is to forge or falsify a paper document. It
is also pertinent to point out that paper documents are
relatively easy to forge through computers. But lest the
reader’s patience murmur immediately on the digital
blindness of the author, it is seemly to add that any
change in digital evidence tends to record any changes
in its tracks: this is immediately acknowledged without
hesitation or qualification. However, the general
reluctance to trust digital evidence without reservation
remains widespread, especially among practitioners: a
factor which may contribute to this view is that
computer and electronic training going beyond the
elementary program skills have been introduced in law
faculties at universities only relatively recently.
Distinction between authenticity and
veracity
It is necessary to draw the distinction between
authenticity and veracity. Authenticity, as is well known
to Civil Law Notaries, states that a copy is a faithful and
true copy of another document. Veracity, on the other
hand, is a statement reflecting the truth, accuracy and
that the document is a correct reliable statement of
what it purports to convey. Veracity therefore refers to
the content, that for example an audit confirms that the
records presented provide a proper view of the
transactions recorded and the state of affairs. This is
different from stating that a copy or extracts from, for
example, financial statements or minutes are faithful
extracts without any comment on the truthfulness of the
contents.
There is no principle objection to admitting both the
authenticity and veracity of digital evidence. The
problem refers to the independent verification (where
necessary) and challenging the evidence.
As suggested, digital evidence like other sources of
evidence, but possibly even more, may be subject to
corruption due to the nature of the input, and may be
subject to corruption or falsification: it is probably
correct to state that due to the characteristics of digital
evidence it is easier to substitute or manipulate, and
therefore this requires greater legislative protection: the
definition of false or tampered evidence to be extended
to clearly include electronic tampering and places.
Furthermore, procedural rules should be amended and
greater attention be made by practitioners and judges.
Reference is not only made to electronic offences as
such, but also to situations where evidence may be
intentionally presented in the knowledge that it has
been tampered with or is not correct.
In this context, the question that therefore arises is
whether to make it a criminal offence for knowingly
producing digital evidence that is materially false or
incomplete, or for the normal sanctions to apply in
relation to perjury, a false oath or the knowing
submission of forged or fabricated documents. It might
be that digital evidence may require more protection in
that it is not merely evidence as other forms of
evidence, but a quality of evidence that requires higher
and additional protection to protect integrity. Malta
does have provisions in the Criminal Code entitled ‘On
Computer misuse’4 which includes as the offence of
impairing the operation of any system, software or ‘the
integrity or reliability of any data’. However, this is
beyond the specific scope of this paper.
A related and more difficult issue is how to challenge
digital evidence. It is to be debated whether the
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3 Vide in this context Stephen Mason, general editor,
Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery &
Admissibility, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007),
Chapter 4.
4 Articles 337B to 337G of the Criminal Code,
Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta,
http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/legislation/english/l
eg/vol_1/chapt9.pdf.
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traditional means are sufficient or adequate. Digital
evidence cannot be cross examined as can a natural
person, however it seems that the normal rules are
nonetheless applicable. A possible approach could be
that while digital evidence, in a similar way that a paper
document or a formal statement may not be cross
examined, its author (if the author can be determined)
certainly may be subject to cross examination. The
difficulty is that the challenge to the digital evidence as
evidence may have a propensity to focus on the author:
and there is nothing novel or specific to digital evidence
relating to cross examining the author by whom the
input is claimed or attributed.
It is clear that in any adversarial procedure, all the
evidence should be available to the parties, and this
includes digital evidence, as well as an ample and
effective opportunity to contradict and discredit. The
conclusion would appear to be that challenging such
evidence is achieved through testing the technical
aspects of digital evidence whilst also using the normal
approach of challenging evidence. On this basis, and
subject to adaptation because of the nature of the facts
evidenced and the medium of transmission and
perception of such evidence, the general rules and
principles will apply to digital evidence.
The weight and importance to attribute to
digital evidence
There seems no reason why weight should not be
attributed to digital evidence in civil proceedings in the
same way as with other sources of evidence. The
traditional rules include as evidence, documents,
technical expertise, ex parte technical opinions,
personal testimony, affidavits, and documents. The term
‘document’ includes not merely physical paper
documents, including print-outs of digital evidence, but
other tangible material objects – although not all such
objects are susceptible of being easily exhibited in legal
proceedings.
The conclusion should be that digital evidence in civil
proceedings stands on the same basis as other
categories of evidence. The admissibility of such
evidence will require more regulation to go beyond a
computer print-out which might be an extract from the
Register, for instance. There will be situations and
difficulties where the evidence viewed through a
computer is evidence that is admissible by itself,
without necessarily having the requirement to be
printed. On this basis, because a digital document can
be visited, revisited and viewed time and time again as
required, it acquires the character of a permanent
recording, and should qualify as evidence as any other
source of evidence.
Burden of proof, moral certainties and the
balance of probabilities 
The general background of Maltese law on civil
evidence is defined above, in broad brush terms, with
its common law derivation and basis on the subject.
Departing from the assumption that digital evidence
in civil proceedings is evidence in the same way as
other forms of evidence, the same general rules on the
burden of proof should apply, even in the case of civil
proceedings. The traditional common law rules on the
burden of proof have also been shaped or tempered
somewhat by the civil law of evidence. The Maltese
formulation is that the burden of proof rests on a
balance or a preponderance of probabilities, drawn from
facts and possibly inferences. However, this alone is
insufficient, and here the continental civil law and
possibly canon law influence may be apparent: the
balance of probabilities also requires the moral
certainty of the court: this notion of moral certainty is
the civil law influence. It is settled law and
jurisprudence that possibility or even probability alone
is not sufficient. The burden of proof requiring moral
certainty calls into question the professional integrity
and assumption of responsibility of the judge.
The exercise here is to translate these rules and legal
language into the realities of civil digital evidence. The
mental process remain more or less the same: a first
assessment is to relate to the functioning of the
electronic or digital systems or the entering of the data
with the inclusionary or exclusionary rules of evidence:
this in answer to the point whether or not the electronic
information or data process qualifies as evidence. The
normal considerations at this point tend to be whether
the source or the author are identifiable, and whether
they be electronically verified independently.
When this preliminary exercise is successfully
concluded in the sense that the data or digital evidence
does indeed qualify as evidence, the mental assessment
attempts to translate the digital data into factual
meaning and sense as evidence, within the relevant
context under review. The factual implications of digital
evidence may or may not require technical knowledge
or skills. The essential point here is that such electronic
factual data are translated into assessments,
evaluations and conclusions, often deductive.
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Digital evidence and the traditional rules of
civil evidence 
From the above, two important consequences follow.
The first is that it follows that the main challenge is to
attribute meaning and consequences to digital
evidence. Clearly, most facts are ‘virtual’ or digital and
therefore are not tangible. At the same time, they
maintain their own train of narrative events and
sequence. The second consequence and indeed most
important conclusion, is that digital evidence in civil
proceedings clearly fits within, and fits well, into the
traditional parameters of civil evidence rules. For
example, there exists the best evidence rule: this means
that a party has to make available, particularly in
adversarial systems, the best possible evidence. Digital
evidence still has to pass the test of quality and
authenticity. It is possible that digital hearsay will
develop with its attendant rules, especially when digital
documents are rendered into court by one party, but
having been derived electronically from another party
claiming to have received such source from a third party.
Moreover, and in the same vein, the traditional healthy
practice of requiring independent evidence to be
verified independently where the facts are disputed,
finds application in the case of digital evidence. An
important existing lead is that related to electronic
signatures: the legal framework already exists for the
verification of the authenticity of electronic signatures,
and to test the authenticity attributed to such
signatures.
It is also clear that any application within the context
of the traditional rules relating to digital evidence in civil
proceedings is to respect fundamentally the principle
that proceedings are adversarial or contradictoire in
nature. Article 6 of the Council of Europe Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and its subsequent Protocols may be the
most important contemporary influence on civil
procedure today: this relates to a fair hearing, and
within such meaning, the concept of equality of arms
remains fundamental. This requires that a party has full
access to the evidence of the other party, a full and
proper opportunity to challenge such evidence and full
facilities to present his version of the case, facts and
submissions – in essence procedural fairness similar to
the traditional common law rule of hearing the other
side. Any scenario of digital evidence and rules of
evidence are clearly subject to the test of conformity
with the requirements of a fair hearing. It has become,
in contemporary civil procedure, a fundamental and
overriding consideration in any given particular rule of
evidence, and digital evidence is no exception.
Conclusion: the role of law schools and of
law firms 
It is clear that civil digital evidence is here with us and
to stay, whether in respect of substantive issues such
as, for instance, copyright or competition issues, or a
purely procedural question of evidence. The challenge
as always is to adapt and to innovate.
Two concluding observations become relevant. The
role of law faculties is important in focusing on the civil
procedural aspects of digital evidence: the traditional
rules, the contemporary rules, those of professional
secrecy, market abuse, insider dealing are all relevant.
However, the study of civil evidence also requires the
need to focus in a systematic manner on digital
evidence as part of the curriculum. What is essential is
that it becomes part of the systematic reflection and
discipline of the curricula. Moreover, the professional
training has to focus on integrating evidence with digital
data.
Perhaps, and almost certainly the most critical,
remains the development of civil digital evidence in and
by law firms. The reason is that practitioners are
problem solvers: they address evolving realities, and, in
the same way as market developments function,
lawyers shape and direct legislative developments.
The aim of this brief paper was to illustrate and
elaborate the point that civil digital evidence does
indeed qualify as evidence, is subject to the rules in the
same way as traditional and contemporary rules of
evidence, and those of equality of arms. The final
reflections related to the important role of law studies
and the critical creative and innovative role of law firms
and practitioners.
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